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Prosecuting Iraqi Gulf War Crimes: Allied
and Israeli Rights Under International
Law
By Louis RENA BERES*
I. INTRODUCTION
Who cares about international law? This cynical question, it seems,
is generally raised whenever major crimes against the law of nations go
unpunished. Living in a century aptly described as the Age of Atrocity,'
there is little reason to believe that states are responsive to any claims but
the presumed imperatives of Realpolitik.2
* Ph.D. Princeton 1971, Professor of Political Science and International Law, Purdue
University
1. Three prominent illustrations of this "age" are the Iraqi crimes that form the subject
of this inquiry, the Cambodian genocide, and the Holocaust. Regarding the Cambodian geno-
cide, see generally WILLIAM SHAWCROSS, SIDESHOW: KISSINGER, NIXON AND THE DE-
STRUCTION OF CAMBODIA (1979); WILLIAM SHAWCROSs, THE QUALITY OF MERCY:
CAMBODIA, HOLOCAUST AND MODERN CONSCIENCE (1984); MOLYDA SZYMUSIAK, THE
STONES CRY OUT: A CAMBODIAN CHILDHOOD 1975-1980 (1986); and LAWYER'S COMMIT-
TEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, KAMPUCHEA: AFTER THE WORST 161 (1990). Regarding the Hol-
ocaust, the subject of literally thousands of books and scholarly articles, see especially PRIMO
LEVI, THE DROWNED AND THE SAVED (1986), and M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Law
and the Holocaust, 9 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 201-305 (1979). Concerning Iraqi crimes, the geno-
cide against the Kurdish people began years before the recent United Nations' authorized Gulf
War. Remarkably this continued until after the war's end. During 1987, Iraq initiated a pol-
icy to depopulate Iraqi Kurdistan. The operation, code-named Al-Anfal Campaign, encom-
passed the systematic destruction of all villages in Kurdistan, the massive use of chemical
weapons against defenseless villagers, and the deportation and execution of tens of thousands
of men, women, and children. In all, at least 180,000 people were killed in the AI-Anfal Cam-
paign. Id. In the opinion of Senator Claiborne Pe, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations: "Had the Gulf War not intervened, it is likely that Iraq's Kurdish population would
have been exterminated." See Mass Killings In Iraq, Hearings before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). Significantly, in 1987 and 1988, from the per-
spective of international law there was "clear evidence of Iraq's conduct." Id. Moreover,
Senator Pell stated: "At that time, both the Reagan administration and the House conferees
vehemently objected to characterizing Iraqi conduct as genocide. We now know that descrip-
tion was very apL" Id
2. "Realpolitik" is power politics or geopolitics. For a systematic look at the presumed
imperatives of Realpolitik by this author, see Louis RENE BERES, REASON AND REALPOLI-
TIK: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND WORLD ORDER (1984); and Louis RENE BERES, AMERICA
OUTSIDE THE WORLD: THE COLLAPSE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1987).
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Yet, there have been important exceptions to legal indifference in
world affairs, at least in the realm of punishment. Although the over-
whelming majority of instances involving aggression, war crimes, geno-
cide and genocide-like crimes committed since -the first world war
(including the Armenian Genocide)3 were carried out with impunity, the
unprecedented infamy of the Holocaust did end with the prosecution of
major Nazi functionaries at Nuremberg.'
The criminal actions of Iraq during the Gulf War should be as pun-
ishable as these other instances of international crimes.5 Between August
2, 1990, the date of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and October 29, 1990, the
U.N. Security Council adopted ten resolutions explicitly condemning the
Baghdad regime for multiple crimes of the gravest nature. Significantly,
the ten Security Council resolutions (two later resolutions concerning en-
forcement were adopted on November 28 and November 29, 1990) were
issued before some of the most serious Iraqi crimes were uncovered. 6
3. For Documentation on the Armenian Genocide, see VAHAXN N. DADRIAN, INST. ON
THE HOLOCAUST AND GENOCIDE, DOCUMENTATION OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE IN
TURKISH SOURCES 138 (1991) in 2 GENOCIDE: A CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHIC REVIEW (Israel
W. Charny ed., 1991); Vahakn N. Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and Interna-
tional Law: The World War IArmenian Case and its Contemporary Ramifications, 14 YALE J.
INT'L L. 221-334 (1989); Vahakn N. Dadrian, The Convergent Aspects of the Armenian and
Jewish Cases of Genocide: A Reinterpretation of the Concept of Holocaust, 3 HOLOCAUST AND
GENOCIDE STUD. 151-169 (1988); Vahakn N. Dadrian, A Textual Analysis of the Key Indict-
ment of the Turkish Military Tribunal Investigating the Armenian Genocide, 44 ARMENIAN
REV. 1-36 (1991); and ROBERT F. MELSON, REVOLUTION AND GENOCIDE: ON THE ORIUIN$
OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AND THE HOLOCAUST (1992).
4. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis Powers, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.TS. 279 (entered into force
for the United States on Sept. 10, 1945); Charter of the International Military Tribunal, an-
nexed to the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis Powers, supra. In 1946, the U.N. General Asscnbly adopted a resolution
affirming the principles of international law as recognized by the Charter of the Nuremburg
Tribunal. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., at 1144, U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946).
This affirmation was followed by General Assembly Resolution 174(11), adopted November
21, 1947, directing the U.N. International Law Commission to "(a) Formulate the principles
of international law recognized in the Charter.of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the judgment
of the Tribunal, and (b) Prepare a draft code of offenses against the peace and security of
mankind." U.N. Doc. A/519, at 112 (1947). The principles formulated are known as the
Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg
Tribunal, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950) (Nuremberg
Principles).
5. See generally supra note 1.
6. For an authoritative and comprehensive inventory of these resolutions and other per-
tinent Gulf War documents, see Current Documents: Gulf War Legal and Diplomatic Docu-
ments, 13 Hous. J. INT'L L. 281-314 (1991) [hereinafter Current Documents]; and George S.
Swan, Presidential Undeclared Warmaking and Functionalist Theory: Dellums v. Bush and
Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 22 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 75-125 (1991-92).
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These crimen contra omnes, crimes so terrible that they mandate univer-
sal enforcement, jurisdiction, and responsibility, would mandate legal
prosecution even if there had been no authorizing resolutions by the U.N.
Security Council.7 This is because the prohibition of the documented
criminal activities of Iraq against Kuwaitis and various other peoples in
Kuwait8 is known as a "peremptory" rule of international law. This
norm is an absolutely binding rule allowing no form of derogation
whatsoever. 9
Our current system of international law establishes the primacy of
justice and human rights in world affairs. The words used so carefully at
Nuremberg, "So far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be
unjust if his wrongs were allowed to go unpunished," derive from the
7. For pertinent codifications of the criminalization of aggression, see, e.g., Treaty Re-
nouncing War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796,
94 U.N.T.S. 57 (also known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Pact of Paris); U.N. CHAR-
TER, art. 2, 4; Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of
States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N.
GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965); Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accord-
ance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp.
No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); Declaration on the Non-use of Force in International
Relations and Permanent Prohibition on the Use of Nuclear Weapons, G.A. Res. 2936, U.N.
GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30 at 5, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972); Charter of the International
Military Tribunal, supra note 4, art. 6; Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Rec-
ognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, supra note 4. See also Convention on
Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, arts. 8. 10-11, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881, 165
L.N.T.S. 19 (Montevideo Convention); Pact of the League of Arab States, Mar. 22, 1945, art.
5, 70 U.N.T.S. 237; Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, chs. H, IV,
V, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 and Protocol of Amendment, Feb. 27,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847 (Protocol of Buenos Aires); Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681, T.LA.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77 (Rio
Treaty); American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, Apr. 30, 1948, 30 U.N.T.S. 55 (Pact of Bo-
gota); Charter of the Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, arts. II, 111, 479 U.N.T.S.
39.
8. Other victims of Iraqi criminal activity include coalition prisoners of war and non-
combatant populations in Israel and Saudi Arabia.
9. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N., Doc. A/
CONF.39/27, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). According to Article 53, "a peremptory norm
of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community
of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character."
Id art. 53, reprinted in 8 LL.M. at 698. Even a treaty that might seek to criminalize forms of
insurgency protected by this peremptory norm would be invalid. Article 53 provides that "[a]
treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general
international law." Id The concept is extended to newly emerging peremptory norms by
Article 64 of the Convention which provides "[i]f a new peremptory norm of general interna-
tional law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and
terminates." Id. art. 64, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. at 703.
1992]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
very ancient principle: nullum crimen sine poena (no crime without a
punishment).10 This principle applies with particular clarity and urgency
to the crimes of Saddam Hussein and his collaborators."'
Today, if the world legal order is to be regarded as viable and pur-
poseful, an effort similar to that at Nuremberg must be undertaken to
prosecute recent Iraqi crimes under international law. 12  These crimes,
10. See generally RICHARD A. FALK ET AL., CRIMES OF WAR 97 (1971). See also ch. I1,
pt. A of International Tribunal for the Far East, in BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, 1 DEFINING
INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION: THE SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE 546 (1975).
11. For documentation of Iraqi crimes, see Iraqi Forces Killings [sic] and Torturing in
Kuwait, Says Amnesty International Fact-Finding Team, AMNESTY INT'L NEWS RELEASE,
Oct. 3, 1990 (Al Index 14/15/90), a preliminary report on widespread charges of Iraqi torture,
willful killing, rape, pillage, and collective reprisals. See also Iraq/Occupied Kuwait Human
Rights Violations Since 2 August, AMNESTY INT'L REP., Dec. 19, 1990 (Al Index MDE 14/
16/90). For personal testimonies of Iraqi brutalities, see Letter from Kuwait, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
14, 1991, at A17 and Shafeeq Ghabra, The Iraqi Occupation of Kuwait: An Eyewitness Ac-
count, 20 J. PALESTINE STUD. 112, 125 (1991). For further documentation see STAFF OF
SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 102D CONG., 1sT SESS., CIVIL WAR IN IRAQ 28
(Comm. Print 1991); Crisis in the Persian Guf. Sanctions, Diplomacy and War: Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Armed Services, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); Human Rights
Abuses in Kuwait and Iraq: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991); The Persian Gulf Crisis: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomms on Arms Con-
trol, International Security and Science, Europe and the Middle East, and on International
Operations of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs and the Joint Economic Committee, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1990).
12. Although not strictly "Nuremberg-category crimes," criminal acts of terrorism spon-
sored by Iraq during the brief Gulf War could qualify as an additional offense for allied prose-
cution. For current conventions in force concerning terrorism, see especially Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Includ-
ing Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532 (entered into force
for the United States on Feb. 13, 1972); Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18,
1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force for the United
States on Dec. 13, 1972); Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 (entered
into force for the United States on Dec. 4, 1969) [hereinafter Tokyo Convention]; Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T 1641, T.I.A.S.
No. 7192 (entered into force for the United States on Oct. 14, 1971) [hereinafter Hague Con-
vention]; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Avia-
tion, Sept 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570 (entered into force for the United States
on Jan. 26, 1973); International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/
146, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979) (entered into
force for the United States on Dec. 7, 1984); European Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977 Europ. T.S. No. 90 (entered into force on Aug. 4, 1978); On Decem-
ber 9, 1985, the U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution condemning all
acts of terrorism as "criminal." Never before had the General Assembly adopted such a com-
prehensive resolution on this question. Yet, except for acts such as hijacking, hostage-taking,
and attacks on internationally protected persons that were criminalized by previous custom
and conventions, the issue of particular acts that actually constitute terrorism was left largely
unaddressed. See United Nations Resolution on Terrorism, G.A. Res. 40/61, U.N. GAOR,
40th Sess., Supp. No.53, at 301, U.N. Doc. A/50/53 (1985).
[Vol. 16
Prosecuting Iraqi Gulf War Crimes
which include "crimes of war," "crimes against peace," and "crimes
against humanity," 3 should be dealt with in another Nuremberg-style
trial 4 and/or through appropriate prosecutions within domestic
courts." Should the Gulf War and its aftermath end without prosecu-
tion of those responsible for the Iraqi war crimes, such as Saddam Hus-
13. "Crimes Against Peace," "Crimes of War," and "Crimes Against Humanity" are de-
fined in Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 4:
(a) CRIMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agree-
ments or assurances, or participation in a Common Plan or conspiracy for the ac-
complishment of any of the foregoing;,
(b) WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such
violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to
slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory,
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages,
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages,
or devastation not justified by military necessity;
(c) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, en-
slavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian pop-
ulation, before or during the war... or persecutions on political, racial, or religious
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of domestic law of the country where
perpetrated.
14. See ROBERT 11. JACKSON, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
(1945), reprinted in THE NORNBERG CASE 3 (as presented by Robert H. Jackson, 1947). The
judgment of the International Military Tribunal of October 1, 1946, rested on the four Allied
Powers' London Agreement of August 8, 1945, to which was annexed a charter establishing
the Tribunal. Nineteen other states subsequently acceded to the Agreement. In addition to
the forty-two volumes of official documents on the Nuremberg Trial published by the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal, the United Nations War Crimes Commission selected and edited
eighty-nine additional cases, published in fifteen volumes as LAw REPORTS OF TRIALS OF
WAR CRMINALs (1947-49). See XV LAw REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra,
at 155-88, for an analysis of defense pleas of "superior orders" in various war crimes trials.
For German war crimes trials after the First World War, including the case of Dithmar and
Boldt, see Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law, 16 AM. J. INt'L L. 674,
724 (1922).
15. Theoretically, another option would be to prosecute such crimes within a perma-
nently-constituted international criminal court (ICC). Although such a court does not yet
exist, the concept goes back to the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Interna-
tional Disputes, opened for signature July 19, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779. In 1937, the idea was re-
vived within a Convention Against Terrorism adopted by the League of Nations, in the form of
an annexed protocol providing for the establishment of a special international criminal court to
prosecute crimes of terror-violence. See Convention for the Creation of an International Crim-
inal Court, opened for signature Nov. 16, 1937, League of Nations O.J. Spec. Supp. 156 (1938),
League of Nations Doc. C.547 (I) M.384 (I) 1937 V (1937), reprinted in 7 INT'L LEcISLATION
878 (1935-37) (Manley 0. Hudson ed., 1941). As only one state, India, ratified this Conven-
tion, it never entered into force. For an excellent and authoritative historical background of the
international criminal court, see M. Cherif Bassiouni & Christopher L Blakesley, The Need
For an International Criminal Court in the New International World Order, 25 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 151-82 (1992).
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sein and the surviving members of the Iraqi Revolutionary Council, 6
justice will have been defiled and international law will be tragically
undermined.
However, certain questions remain. Who has the authority to prose-
16. The liability of Saddam Hussein and his ruling associates, in particular for crimes
committed under international law, is well established under the principle of respondeat supe-
rior. Literally, "[L]et the master answer," is the converse of the doctrine of "superior orders,"
and is designed to ensure that obedience to authority by subordinates entails no criminal con-
sequences. Moreover, the superior's responsibility extends to situations even if no afirmative
orders to commit crimes have been given. According to BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 681 (5th
ed. 1983):
Let the master answer. This maxim means that a master is liable in certain cases for
the wrongful acts of his servant, and a principal for those of his agent. Under this
doctrine master is responsible for want of care on servant's part toward those to
whom master owes duty to use care ....
Understood in terms of international law, the general principle is this: A superior officer is
normally liable for war crimes committed by persons under his command provided that he
gave the relevant order or that he knew of a planned violation and failed to prevent it. More-
over, a commanding officer may be personally liable for war crimes after the events if he knew
of the committed acts but failed to institute proceedings against the perpetrators. See Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
International Armed Conflict, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, arts. 86-87, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
(Protocol I), cited in INGRID DETrER DE Lupis, THE LAW OF WAR 359 (1987). Paragraph
501 of U.S. Field Manual 27-10, Dep't of the Army, Dep't of the Army Field Manual 27-10:
The Law of Land Warfare §§ 501, 510 (1956), based on the judgment over Japanese General
Tomayuki Yamashita, stipulates that any commander who had actual knowledge, or should
have had knowledge, that troops or other persons under his control were complicit in war
crimes and failed to take necessary steps to protect the laws of war was guilty of a war crime.
According to Paragraph 501 (Responsibility for Acts of Subordinates):
In some cases, military commanders may be responsible for war crimes committed
by subordinate members of the armed forces, or other persons subject to their con-
trol. Thus, for instance, when troops commit massacres and atrocities against the
civilian population of occupied territory or against prisoners of war, the responsibil-
ity may rest not only with the actual perpetrators but also with the commander.
Such a responsibility arises directly when the acts in question have been committed
in pursuance of an order of the commander concerned. The commander is also re-
sponsible if he has an actual knowledge, or should have knowledge, through reports
received by him or through other means, that troops or other persons subject to his
control are about to commit or have committed a war crime and he fails to take the
necessary and reasonable steps to insure compliance with the law of war or to punish
violators thereof ....
See also RICHARD A. FALK ET AL., CRIMES OF WAR: A LEGAL, POLITICAL-DOCUMVNTARY,
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO THE RESPONSIBILITY OF LEADERS, CITIZENS AND
SOLDIERS FOR CRIMINAL ACrS IN WARS (Vintage Books 1971). For the Yamashita decision,
see In The Matter of Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1945) cited in FALK, supra, at 141-61. Paragraph
510 denies the defense of "act of state" to such alleged criminals. It provides that, although a
person who committed an act constituting an international crime may have acted as head of
state or as a responsible government official, he is not relieved, thereby, from responsibility for
that act. Paragraph 510, supra. This paragraph, of course, is drawn from Principle III of the
Nuremberg Principles and in the formulation of these principles by the International Law
Commission. See Formulation of Nurnberg Principles, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 181 (1957).
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cute Saddam Hussein and his collaborators? How and where should the
trials occur? This essay will address the unique role of both the United
States and Israel in carrying out such a prosecution. The legal and moral
authority of Washington and Jerusalem to prosecute Iraqi crimes will be
examined. This essay will conclude that while political and practical ob-
stacles remain serious impediments to justice, both the United States and
Israel possess a legal and moral basis to prosecute Iraqi Gulf War
Crimes. Given the potentially positive effect of such judicial proceedings
on the legitimacy of international law as a basis for addressing "Nurem-
berg" - type crimes, it is urged that both states move promptly toward
such prosecutions.
II. AMERICAN RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
When the United States took the prosecutorial initiative at Nurem-
berg, it was already demonstrating its commitment to a higher law-the
law of nature. In addition, this initiative reflected a like commitment to
international law, which also derives from higher law. Moreover, United
States initiatives at Nuremberg flowed from the essential understanding
that international law is U.S. law and that correct enforcement of the
latter requires adherence to the expectations of the former. It follows
that the American law-enforcing stance at the end of World War II was
not fashioned out of whole cloth. Rather, it was already in existence and
merely restated and reaffirmed at Nuremberg.17
From the United States' perspective, the Nuremberg obligations to
bring major Iraqi criminals to trial are, in a sense, doubly binding.18 This
17. The higher law origins of American law are embedded in Blackstone's Commentaries,
which recognize that all law results from those "principles of natural justice, in which all the
learned of every nation agree." See IV WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND *66. On the incorporation of international law into United States domes-
tic law, the key case has been The Paquete Habana, wherein the U.S. Supreme Court stated,
"[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts
of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no control-
ling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and
usages of civilized nations." 175 U.S. 677 (1900). See also MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTrTU-
TIONAL DIPLOMACY 229-82 (1990).
18. Ironically, however, it was American diplomatic error that may have contributed to
Iraq's decision to undertake criminal activity against Kuwait and other victim states. In this
regard, the following excerpt from the minutes of the address given to Saddam Hussein by
April Glaspie, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, on July 25, 1990, is instructive: "I [Ambassador
Glaspie] admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. I know you need funds.
We understand that, and are of the opinion that you should have the opportunity to rebuild
your country. But we hold no opinion about what are inter-Arab disputes, such as your border
19921
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is because these obligations represent not only current obligations under
international law, but also the higher-law obligations found in the Ameri-
can political tradition."' By codification of the principle that basic
human rights in war and in peace are now "peremptory," the Nuremberg
obligations reflect a perfect convergence2 ° between international law and
the enduring legal foundation of our American Republic.
A. Basis of Higher Law
1. American Political Traditions of Higher Law
The principle of a higher law is not just "any principle." It is one of
the most fundamental principles in the history of the United States, rest-
ing on the acceptance of specific notions of right and justice that exist
because of their self-evident merit. Such notions, as Blackstone declared,
are nothing less than "the eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to
which the creator himself in all his dispensations conforms; and which he
has enabled human reason to discover so far as they are necessary for the
conduct of human actions."'2 1
When Jefferson set to draft the Declaration of Independence, he
drew freely upon Aristotle, Cicero, Grotius, Vattel, Pufendorf, Burlama-
qui, and Locke's Second Treatise of Government. Asserting the right of
disagreement with Kuwait. I was in the American embassy in Kuwait during the late sixties.
The instructions we had at that time were that we should have nothing to do with this issue
and the issue was not connected to U.S. concerns." See Current Documents, supra note 6, at
295.
19. Such higher-law obligations include all elements of the doctrine of natural law as It
has entered American constitutional theory, especially the idea that certain norms can never be
broken with impunity.
20. Such convergence notwithstanding, it is clear that fulfillment of Nuremberg obliga-
tions could entail substantial political costs for the United States. Recognizing this, William V.
O'Brien comments: "A return to the Nuremberg Precedent, in short, may be opening a Pan-
dora's Box .... The question is whether the perfectly valid desire to punish Saddam Hussein
and his henchmen for an extraordinarily illegal, immoral and destructive war should prevail
over prudent caution in the use of the institution of war crimes trials." William V. O'Brien,
The Nuremberg Precedent and the Gulf War, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 400 (1991). In my judgment,
O'Brien's question must be answered in the affirmative. Indeed, justice in this matter must take
into account not only the requirements of retribution and deterrence, but also the expectation
of memory. As Elie Wiesel has written: "Justice without memory is an incomplete justice, false
and unjust. To forget would be an absolute injustice in the same way that Auschwitz was the
absolute crime. To forget would be the enemy's final triumph." Testimony by Elie Wiesel at
the Barbie Trial cited in ELIE WIESEL, FROM THE KINGDOM OF MEMORY: REMINISCENCES
BY ELIE WIESEL 187 (1990). Here of course, Wiesel is speaking of a different set of crimes, i.e.,
particular crimes of the Holocaust, but his argument clearly applbes to other genocides and
crimes against humanity.
21. I BLACKSTONE, supra note 17 at *40. Examples of such notions of right and justice
would be the punishability of egregious crimes.
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revolution whenever government becomes destructive of "certain inalien-
able rights," the Declaration of Independence posits a natural order in
the world.' In this natural order, laws are external to all human will
and are discoverable through human reason.
By the eighteenth century, however, God had been withdrawn as
the "Higher Source of Law" and transformed into the "Prime Mover" of
the universe. In place of God, "nature" provided an appropriate substi-
tute.23 Reflecting the influence of Isaac Newton's Principia, published in
1686, all of creation could now be taken as an expression of divine will.
Hence, the only way to know God's will was to discover the law of na-
ture. Thus, in discovering law, Locke and Jefferson had deified nature
and denatured God.
How did the founding fathers view this "law of nature?" As Jeffer-
son learned from Locke, it was the law of reason. According to Locke's
second treatise:
The state of nature has a law to govern it, which obliges every one:
and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult
it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another
in his life, health, liberty, or possessions ....
In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live
by another rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that
measure God has set to the actions of men ....
A criminal, who having renounced reason, the common rule and mea-
sure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence and
slaughter he hath committed on one, declared war against all
mankind.24
According to Locke and Jefferson, since reason is the only precise
guide to what God has given to humankind, reason is the only founda-
tion of true law. This Lockean and Jeffersonian idea of a transcendent or
higher law is expressed not only in the Declaration of Independence, but
also in the Bill of Rights. The Ninth Amendment, in expressing that
"the enumeration of certain rights in this Constitution shall not prejudice
other rights not so enumerated,"2 reflects the belief in a law superior to
22. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERIcAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW (1955); ALEXANDER P. D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW: AN INTRODUC-
TION TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1951).
23. Nature was replacing God as the source for lawful behavior.
24. See JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GoVERNMENT 123 (T.L Cook ed., 1947).
25. U.S. CONSr. art. IX. According to Clinton Rossiter, there exists a "deep-seated con-
viction" among Americans "that the Constitution is an expression of the Higher Law, that it is
in fact imperfect man's most perfect rendering of what Blackstone saluted as 'the eternal,
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the will of human governance. This belief was held from ancient times to
the present moment.
2. The Historic Development of Higher Law
For more than two thousand years, the idea of natural law has
served as the ultimate standard of right and wrong, as the final determi-
nant of true law as opposed to edicts based upon raw power. Already
apparent in the Antigone of Sophocles and the ethics and rhetoric of Aris-
totle, this idea-tied closely to theology for many centuries-has effec-
tively placed law above law making. At the same time, it is obvious that
humankind has not only been indifferent to the law of nature, but has
often even coupled this indifference with adherence to undiscovered
"laws" that reject justice. In this connection, we may recall Pascal's ob-
servation: "It is odd, when one thinks of it, that there are people in the
world who, having renounced all the laws of God and nature, have them-
selves made law which they rigorously obey . "..."26
The fragments of Heraclitus attest to the antiquity of the idea of a
higher law: "For all human laws are nourished by one, which is divine.
For it governs as far as it will, and is sufficient for all, and more than
enough."27 Such Heracitean dicta, offered somewhere around 500 B.C.,
later entered into Stoic philosophy by describing one universal and ra-
tional law.
In Antigone, Sophocles taught that the function of true law was
properly seen as an act of discovery which challenged the superiority of
human rule-making. 8 Because it explores the essential conflict between
claims of the state and claims of individual conscience, Antigone has
since been taken to represent the incontestable supremacy of a higher law
over man-made law. For example, in the nineteenth century, Thoreau,
citing Antigone as a vivid illustration of civil disobedience, stated that
men live with "too passive a regard for the moral laws."29
Building upon Plato's theory of Ideas, which sought to elevate "na-
immutable laws of good and evil, to which the creator himself in all his dispensations con-
forms; and which he has enabled human reason to discover so far as they are necessary for the
conduct of human actions.'" Clinton Rossiter, preface to CORWIN, supra note 22, at vA.
26. See D'ENTREVEs, supra note 22, at 4.
27. See § 81, Fragment No. DK 22BI14 of THE PRESOCRATICS 75 (Philip Wheelwright
ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1960). The authoritative text for the fragments of Heraclitus is HERMANN
DIELS & WALTHER KRANZ, DIE FRAGMENTE DER VORSOKRAITICER (6th ed., Weidmann
1966).
28. SOPHOCLES, ANTIGONE, vv, 450 et seq., cited in CORWIN, supra note 22, at 6.
29. See HENRY DAVID THOREAU, On the Duty of Civil Disobedience, in WALDEN, ORl
LIFE IN THE WOODS AND ON THE Dury OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (Signet 1960).
[Vol. 16
Prosecuting Iraqi Gulf War Crimes
ture" from the sphere of contingent facts to the realm of immutable ar-
chetypes or Forms, Aristotle advanced the concept of "natural justice."'
Quoting Antigone, he argued that "an unjust law is not a law." 31 This
position, of course, is in stark contrast to the opinion held by Sophists
that justice is never more than an expression of supremacy, which
Thrasymachus calls, in Plato's Republic, "the interest of the stronger." 32
The Stoics, whose legal philosophy arose on the threshold of the
Greek and Roman worlds, regarded nature itself as the supreme legisla-
tor in the moral order.33 Applying Platonic and Aristotelian thought to
the emerging cosmopolis, they defined this order as one in which human-
kind can communicate directly with the gods through its divinely
granted capacity to reason. Since this definition required an expansion of
Plato's and Aristotle's developing notions of universalism, the Stoics ar-
ticulated a division between "lex aeterna," "ius natural," and "ius
humanum."
"Lex aeterna" is the law of reason of the cosmos or "the logos"
which rules the universe. As an emanation of cosmic reason, human rea-
son rules the lives of men. It follows that natural law partakes of eternal
law, though it has a more limited range of application. Unlike the more
elitist conception of Plato (and, to a certain extent, Aristotle), the Stoic
idea of an innate right reason presumed no divisions between peoples.
Rather, in linking all persons with the cosmic order, it established the
essential foundations of true universality.3'
Cicero, in De Republica, defined the state as a "coming together of a
considerable number of men who are united by a common agreement
about law and rights and by the desire to participate in mutual advan-
tages."35 This definition sheds light on the problems surrounding posi-
tivist jurisprudence, a legal philosophy that values a state's edicts as
30. See CORWiN, supra note 22, at 7.
31. Id,
32. "Right is the interest of the stronger," says Thrasymachus in bk. I, § 338 of PLATO,
THE REPUBLIC (3. Jowett trans., 1875). "Justice is a contract neither to do nor to suffer
wrong," says Glaucon, id, bk. II, § 359. See also Philus in bk. III, § 5 of CICERO, DE
REPUBLICA.
33. See CORWiN, supra note 22, at 9. "The Stoics... thought of Nature or the Universe
as a living organism, of which the material world was the body, and of which the Deity or the
Universal Reason was the pervading, animating, and governing soul; and natural law was the
rule of conduct laid down by this Universal Reason for the direction of mankind." SALMOND,
JURISPRUDENCE 27 (7th ed. 1924), cited in CoRwiN, supra note 22, at 9.
34. See CORWIN, supra note 22, at 9.
35. Spoken by Scipio in bk. I of DeRepublica, cited in ALEXANDER P. D'ENTREVES, THE
NOTION OF THE STATE 24 (1967).
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intrinsically just and obligatory. In a famous passage of De Republica,
Cicero set forth the classic statement on natural law:
True law is right reason, harmonious with nature, diffused among all,
constant, eternal; a law which calls to duty by its commands and re-
strains from evil by its prohibitions .... It is a sacred obligation not to
attempt to legislate in contradiction to this law; nor may it be dero-
gated from nor abrogated. Indeed, by neither the Senate nor the peo-
ple can we be released from this law; nor does it require any but oneself
to be its expositor or interpreter. Nor is it one law at Rome and an-
other at Athens; one now and another at a late time; but one eternal
and unchangeable law binding all nations through all time .... 36
Yet what is to be done when positive law is at variance with true
law?37 The Romans had a remedy. They incorporated in all statutes a
contingency clause that man-made law could never abrogate obligations
that are sacred.38 On several occasions, Cicero and others invoked this
clause, or '/us," against one statute or another. In this way, the written
law of the moment, never more than an artifact of the civic community,
remained subject to right reason.39
Later, St. Augustine reaffirmed that temporal law (man-made law)
must conform to the unchangeable eternal law, which he defined as "the
reason or will of God or 'ratio divina vel voluntas Dei.'" Aquinas contin-
ued this tradition of denying the status of law to prescriptions that are
unjust (lex iniusta non est lex). "Human law," he wrote in the Summae,
"has the quality of law only insofar as it proceeds according to right
reason; and in this respect it is clear that it derives from the eternal law.
Insofar as it deviates from reason it is called an unjust law, and has the
quality not of law, but of violence."'
The concept of a higher law was widely integrated into medieval
jurisprudential thought. According to John of Salisbury's Policraticus,
"There are certain precepts of the law which have perpetual necessity,
having the force of law among all nations and which absolutely cannot be
broken."4 1 Recognizing the idea that all political authority must be in-
36. See CICERO, I DE LEGIBUS, cited in CORWIN, supra note 22, at 10; D'ENTREVs,
supra note 22, at 20-21.
37. Positive law is man-made law specifically enacted or adopted by proper authority for
the government of an organized jural society. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 606 (5th ed.
1983). True law refers to law as existing and subject to discovery. In this sense it is fixed,
permanent and universal. This is law as eternal, natural and of t higher origin.
38. See CORWIN, supra note 22, at 12.
39. Id. at 13.
40. See D'ENTREVES, supra note 22, at 42-43.
41. See CORWIN, supra note 22, at 17-18.
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trinsically limited, John noted that the prince "may not lawfully have
any will of his own apart from that which the law or equity enjoins, or
the calculation of the common interest requires." 42 Natural law, as a
result, exists to frustrate political injustice.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, natural law doctrine
was reaffirmed and secularized by Grotius. Reviving the Ciceronian idea
of natural law and its underlying optimism about human nature, Grotius
must be credited with liberating this idea from any remaining depen-
dence on ecclesiastical or Papal interpretation. Building upon the prior
speculations of the Dominican Francisco de Vitoria, who had proclaimed
a natural community of humankind and the universal validity of human
rights, Grotius fashioned a connection from the Christian oecumene of
the Middle Ages to a new interstate society. In this regard, he strength-
ened the idea of a universally valid natural law transcending in obligation
all human law, including the law of the sovereign state.43
Unlike Machiavelli and Hobbes, Grotius did not reduce law to the
will of the prince or of the state. Rather, recognizing such will as a con-
stitutive element in the international legal order, he understood that the
binding quality of human edicts must be derived from the overriding to-
tality of natural imperatives. As a result, he proceeded to reject "raison
d'etat" as a just cause for war. As noted by the Swiss scholar Emmerich
de Vattel in the 1758 edition of The Law of Nations (a work in which
42. Id. at 19.
43. In this context, international law also authorizes individuals within certain states to
resort to force as insurgents as a permissible means to secure human rights. Although spe-
cially-constituted UN committees and the UN General Assembly have repeatedly condemned
acts of international terrorism, they exempt those activities that derive from "the inalienable
right to self-determination and independence of all peoples under colonial and racist regimes
and other forms of alien domination and the legitimacy of their struggle, in particular the
struggle of national liberation movements, in accordance with the purposes and principles of
the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the organs of the United Nations." This exemp-
tion, from the 1973 General Assembly Report of the Ad Hoe Committee on International Ter-
rorism, is corroborated by Article 7 of the General Assembly's 1974 Definition of Aggression.
See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess,
Supp. No. 28, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/9028 (1973); Resolution on the Definition ofAggression, G.A.
Res. 3314, U.N.GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 144, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974), reprinted
in 13 I.L.M. 710, 714 (1974). Article 7 refers to the October 24, 1970, Declaration on Princi-
ples of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, G.A.
Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. De. A/8028 (1971), reprinted
in 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970). For a comprehensive and authoritative inventory of sources of inter-
national law concerning the right to use force on behalf of self-determination, compiled by the
Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, see AURELIU CRisTEscu, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION: HISTORICAL
AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENT ON THE BASIS OF UNITED NATIONS INSTRUMENTS, E/CN.4/
Sub.2/404/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. ES0.XIV.3 (1981).
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several American fathers of independence and the Bill of Rights discov-
ered important maxims of political liberty): "No agreement can bind, or
even authorize a man to violate the natural law.""
3. The Transition of Natural Law into American Political
Theory
This brings us directly to the conveyance of natural law ideas into
American political theory. This transition was preeminently the work of
Locke's Second Treatise on Civil Government (1690). 45 The codified
American "duty" to revolt when governments commit "a long train of
abuses and usurpations" flows from Locke's notion that civil authority
can never extend beyond the securing of humankind's natural rights.46
Significantly, the motto that Jefferson chose for his seal was, "Rebellion
to Tyrants Is Obedience to God."47
This theory of a higher law which is found, inter alia, in the Bill of
Rights, is based on clarity, self-evidence and coherence. Its validity can-
not be shaken by the presumed imperatives of geopolitics. To ignore the
Bill of Rights in the wake of egregious international crimes would be
illogical and self-contradictory, because it would nullify the immutable
and universal law of nature from which the first ten amendments derive.
Therefore it follows that to act against the principles of the Bill of
Rights is to act against the historic and permanent jurisprudential foun-
dations of the United States. These foundations are grounded in natural
law. No exhortations of "prudence" can or should require America to
set aside these principles.48
4. American Prosecution of Iraqi War Crimes
As discussed, higher law in accord with international law affords a
legal and moral basis by which to prosecute those responsible for Iraqi
war crimes. However the more practical question remains: Where
should prosecution of such crimes take place?49 Nuremberg had been
44. See Albert de LaPradelle, Introduction to EMMERICH DEL VATrEL, LE DROIT DES
GENS [THE LAW OF NATIONS] (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916).
45. See CORWIN, supra note 22, at 61.
46. Id.
47. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, IV WORKS 362 (New York, P.L. Ford ed. 1892-99).
48. See supra note 17.
49. After the Second World War, three judicial solutions were adapted to the problem of
determining the proper jurisdiction for trying Nazi offenses by the victim States. These solu.
tions were in addition to the specially-constituted Nuremberg Tribunal. See GIDEON
HAUSNER, JUSTICE IN JERUALEM 315-16 (Schocken Books 1966).
The first solution involved the creation of special courts set up for the express purpose of
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widely expected to be a precursor to the establishment of a permanent
international criminal court for the prosecution of international crimes.Y°
No such court has yet been created. Contrary to common belief, the
International Court of Justice at the Hague has absolutely no penal or
criminal jurisdiction, and is therefore unsuitable.51
One obvious jurisdictional solution, of course, would be to parallel
Nuremberg. Specifically, a specially-constituted tribunal for the sole pur-
pose of prosecuting Iraqi war crimes can be established. Legal precedent
and justification for possible venues can be found in the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.52 Article VI
prosecuting Nazi war criminals. This solution was adopted in Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hol-
land, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland. Id
The second solution, adopted in Great Britain, Australia, Canada, Greece, and Italy, in-
volved the establishment of special military courts. Ido
The third solution brought the Nazis and their collaborators before ordinary courts. This
solution was accepted in Norway, Denmark and Yugoslavia. Although not in existence at the
time of the commission of the war crimes in question, the state of Israel also adopted this
solution. Id
50. See M. Cherif Bassiouni & Christopher L. Blakesley, The Need for an International
Criminal Court in the New International World Order, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 151-82
(1992).
51. However, the International Court of Justice (IC) does have jurisdiction over disputes
concerning the interpretation and application of a number of specialized human rights conven-
tions. Such jurisdiction is accorded by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, art. 9, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into
force on Jan. 12, 1951); Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave
Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, art. 10, 266 U.N.T.S 3
(entered into force on April 30, 1957); Convention on the Political Rights of Women, Mar. 31,
1953, art. 9, 27 U.S.T. 1909, T.I.A.S. No. 8289, 193 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force for the
United States on July 7, 1976); Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951,
art. 38, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force on Oct. 4, 1967); Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness, art. 14, G.A. Res. 896, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 21, at 49, U.N. Doc.
A/2890 (1954) (entered into force on Dec. 13, 1975). Yet, in exercising its jurisdiction the ICJ
still must confront significant difficulties in bringing recalcitrant States into contentious pro-
ceedings. Currently there exists no means to effectively ensure the attendance of defendant
States before the Court. Although many States have acceded to the Optional Clause of the
Statute of the ICJ, these accessions are watered down by many attached reservations. Statute
of the International Court of Justice, art. 36, 59 Stat. 1055 (1945).
52. However, this does not mean that the creation of appropriate tribunals would be con-
tingent upon Iraqi crimes being authentic instances of genocide as defined at the Convention.
Rather, such a creation would still be consistent with related "genocide-like" crimes; specifi-
cally, crimes that may derive from a number of other sources in international law. See Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948); European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4., 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5 (entered into force on Sept. 3, 1953); Convention Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees, supra note 51 (this Convention should be read in conjunction
with the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted by the General Assembly on
December 16, 1966, and entered into force on October 4, 1967); Convention on the Political
Rights of Women, supra note 51; Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
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of this Convention provides that trials for violation of the Convention be
conducted "by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which
the act was committed, or by any such international penal tribunal as
may have jurisdiction. ' 53 From a strictly jurisprudential perspective,
crimes of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity are
offenses against humankind over which exists universal jurisdiction and a
universal obligation to prosecute. 4
Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N.
Doc. A/4684 (1961); International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, opened for signature March 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 352
(1966) (entered into force on Jan. 4, 1969); International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 22C0, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967) (entered into
force on Jan. 3, 1976); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signa-
ture Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N.DoC.
A/6316 (1967), reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 368 (1967) (entered into fbrce on March 23, 1976)
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, at 1,
O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/I, 23 doe. 21 rev. 6 (1979), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970)
(entered into force on July 18, 1978). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The Inter.
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (together with its Optional Protocol of 1976),
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, known collectively
as the International Bill of Rights, serve as the touchstone for the normative protection of
human rights.
53. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra
note 51. The Genocide Convention was submitted to the Senate by President Harry S. Tru-
man in June, 1949. On February 19, 1986, the Senate consented to ratification with the reser-
vation that legislation be passed which conforms U.S. law to the precise terms of the Treaty.
This enabling legislation was approved by Congress in October 1988 and signed into law by
President Ronald Reagan on November 4, 1988. Genocide Convention Implementation Act
of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (1988). This legislation amends the U.S. Criminal Code to make
genocide a Federal offense. Id. It also sets a maximum penalty of life imprisonment when
death results from a criminal act as defined by the law. Id. The Genocide Convention pros-
cribes conduct that is juristically distinct from other forms of prohibited wartime killing (i.e.,
killing involving acts constituting crimes of war and crimes against humanity). Although
crimes against humanity are linked to wartime actions, the crime of genocide can be commit-
ted in peacetime or during a war. According to Article I of the Genocide Convention: "The
contracting parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of
war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish." Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 51, art. 1.
54. The principle of universal jurisdiction is founded upon the presumption of solidarity
between the states in the fight against crime. It is mentioned in the. Corpus Juris Civilis; in bk.
II, ch. 20 of HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLi Ac PAClS LIBRI TRES [THE LAW o WAR AND
PEACE 504-07 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1964); and in bk. I, ch. 19 of DE VATrEL, supra note
44, at 93. The case for universal jurisdiction (which is strengthened wherever extradition Is
difficult or impossible to obtain) is also built into the four Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949, which unambiguously impose upon the High Contracting Parties the obligation to pun-
ish certain grave breaches of their rules, regardless of where the infraction was committed or
the nationality of the authors of the crimes. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened .for signature Aug. 12, 1949,
art. 49, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Conven-
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In this case, good reasons exist why the United States should take
the lead in the prosecution of major Iraqi criminals. These reasons in-
dude the special role of the United States in military operations support-
ing the pertinent Security Council resolutions as well as the historic
American role at Nuremberg in 1945. Further, the United States has a
long history of accepting jurisdictional responsibility under international
law.5
5
As noted by the Sixth Circuit in Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, "[t]he law
of the United States includes international law, [and] [i]ntemational law
recognizes 'universal jurisdiction' over certain offenses." 5 6 Article VI of
the Constitution and a number of court decisions make all international,
conventional, and customary law, the supreme law of the land. 7 In ad-
dition, the Nuremberg Tribunal itself acknowledged that the participat-
ing powers "have done together what any one of them might have done
singly."58
tion]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Convention Rela-
tive to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, art. 129, 6
U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364,75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Con-
vention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365,75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth
Geneva Convention]. Accord ch. 6 of M.C. BASSIOUNI, II INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION IN
US LAW AND PRACTICE (1983). See also Restatement (Revised) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States, §§ 402-404, 443-445 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1984), 18 U.S.C. § III 6(c).
55. In addition to the territorial principle and the nationality principle, there are three
other traditionally recognized bases of jurisdiction under international law. First, the protec-
tiveprinciple determines jurisdiction by reference to the national interest injured by the offense.
Second, the universality principle determines jurisdiction by reference to the custody of the
person committing the offense. Finally, the passive personality principle, which determines ju-
risdiction by reference to the nationality of the person injured by the offense. Note, however,
the Genocide Convention itself does not stipulate universal jurisdiction. Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 51, art. 6. Persons charged
with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be tried by a competent
tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international
penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall
have accepted its jurisdiction.
In 1985, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that accused Nazi
war criminal John Demjanjuk could be extradited to Israel to face trial. Demjanjuk v. Petrov-
sky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985). See also M. CHERIF BASsIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL LAW 286 (1986).
56. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 582.
57. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677.
58. Apart from the prosecution of Nazi war criminals, there have been only two trials
under the Genocide Convention by competent tribunals of States where such crimes were com-
mitted. In Equatorial Guinea, the tyrant Macis had been slaughtering his subjects and pillag-
ing his country for a number of years. He was ultimately overthrown, found guilty of a
number of crimes, including genocide, and executed. However, in a report on the trial the legal
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Finally, to exercise its special responsibilities under international
and domestic law, the United States already possesses the competence to
prosecute egregious Iraqi crimes in its own federal district courts.59 Sec-
tions 818 and 821 of title 10 of the United States Code, which form part
of an extraterritorial statutory scheme, and Section 3231 of title 18 of the
United States Code expressly grant such authority. It follows from this
that the legal machinery for prosecuting Saddam Hussein and others re-
sponsible for Iraqi war crimes is already well-established under interna-
tional and United States law. What is now needed is the political will to
make this machinery work.'
officer of the International Commission of Jurists concluded that Macis had been wrongfully
convicted of genocide. See LEO KUPER, THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE 16-17 (1985). Also,
in Kampuchea, when the Khmer Rouge were overthrown by the Vietnamese, the successor
government instituted criminal proceedings against the former Prime Minister, Pol Pot, and
the Deputy Prime Minister on charges of genocide. The accused were found guilty of the
crime, in absentia, by a people's revolutionary tribunal. Id.
59. Since its founding, the United States has reserved the right to enforce international
law within its own courts. The American Constitution confers on Congress the power "to
define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the
law of nations." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. Pursuant to this Constitutional prerogative,
the first Congress, in 1789, passed the Alien Tort Statute. This statute authorized United
States federal courts to hear those civil claims by aliens alleging acts committed "in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States" when the alleged wrongdoers can be
found in the United States. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988). At that time, of
course, the particular target of this legislation was piracy on the high seas.
Over the years, United States federal courts have rarely invoked the "law of nations," and
then only in such cases where the acts in question had already been proscribed by treaties or
conventions. In 1979, a case seeking damages for foreign acts of torture was filed in the federal
courts. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). In a complaint filed jointly with
his daughter, Dolly, Dr. Joel Filartiga, a well-known Paraguayan physician and artist and an
opponent of President Alfredo Stroessner's genocidal regime, alleged that members of that
regime's police force had tortured and murdered his son, Joelito. Id. On June 30, 1980, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that since an international consensus condemn-
ing torture has crystallized, torture violates the "law of nations" for purposes of the Alien Tort
Statute. Id As a result, it held that United States courts have jurisdiction under the statute to
hear civil suits by the victims of foreign torture, if the alleged international outlaws are found
in the United States. Id
60. Regarding custody by abduction, two discrete issues present themselves: Seizure of
hostes humani generis (common enemy of mankind) when custody cannot be obtained via
extradition and seizure of hostes humani generis who is a sitting head of state. On the first
issue, consider that in 1986 President Reagan authorized procedures for the forcible abduction
of suspected terrorists from other states for trial in U.S. courts. See John Walcott & Andy
Pasztor, Reagan Ruling to Let CIA Kidnap Terrorists Overseas is Disclosed, WALL ST. J., Feb.
20, 1987, at 1. However, the statutory authority for President Reagan's posture was contin-
gent upon the terrorist acts involving the taking of U.S. citizens ho.tage. Such acts are subject
to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts under the Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Hostage-Taking. 18 U.S.C. § 1203. In 1987, in international waters, the F.B.I. lured
a Lebanese national named Fawaz Younis onto a yacht and transported him by force to the
U.S. for trial. His abduction was based upon his suspected involvement in a 1985 hijacking of
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I. ISRAEL'S RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
On Friday, January 18, 1991, eight SCUD missiles were fired at Tel-
Aviv by Saddarn Hussein's government in Iraq.6 Unquestionably an act
of aggression under international law, 62 this attack was followed by the
firing of thirty-one additional SCUDs directed exclusively at civilian
populations in Israel.63 Baghdad's last missile attack against Israel took
place on February 25, 1991.
What are Israel's rights and obligations to prosecute these crimes
under international law? Clearly, the norms of civilized international re-
a Jordanian airliner at Beirut airport in which all American nationals had been held hostage.
See G. Gregory Schuetz, Apprehending Terrorists Overseas Under United States and Interna-
tional Law: A Case Study of the Fawaz Younis Arrest, 29 HARV. INT'. L.J. 499, 501 (1988).
On the second issue, recall that under international law there is normally a substantial
difference between abduction of a terrorist or other hostes humanigeneris and abduction of any
head of state. Indeed, there is almost always a presumption of sovereign immunity, a binding
rule that exempts each state and its high officials from thejudicial jurisdiction of another state.
Although the rule of sovereign immunity is certainly not absolute in the post-Nuremberg
world order, the right of one state to seize a high official from another state is exceedingly
limited.
In Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, Chief Justice Marshall went even further, arguing for
"'the exemption of the person of the sovereign from arrest or detention within a foreign terri-
tory." 11 U.S. (1 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812). Nevertheless, where the alleged crimes in question
are of a Nuremberg-category and no other means exist whereby to gain custody of the perti-
nent head of state, the expectations of nullum crimen sine poena (no crime without punish-
ment) may override those of sovereign immunity. In the United States, the terms of the Posse
Comitatus Act, prohibit the American military from undertaking domestic law enforcement.
18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1988). According to several authoritative memoranda, this prohibition does
not apply outside the United States. See John Quigley, Enforcement of Human Rights in U&
Court The Trial of Persons Kidnapped Abroad, in WORLD JUSTICE? U.S. COURTS AND IN-
TERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 59-80 (Mark Gibney ed., 1991). Therefore, it would appear
that the United States has authority under its own and international law to gain custody of
Saddam Hussein et al by forcible abduction if necessary. This argument is all the more com-
pelling in view of American seizure of General Manuel Noriega, whom Washington regarded
as a head of state, from Panama in 1990. Noriega, it should be recalled, had been charged with
violations of U.S. drug trafficking laws-norms substantially less serious than those revolving
around Nuremberg-category crimes.
61. For an authoritative assessment of the SCUD toll from 39 missile attacks, see SCUD
Tolk Summing Up the 39 Missile Attacks, JERUSALEM POST (Int'l Edition), March 9, 1991, at
3.
62. According to the United Nations Charter. "All members shall refrain in their inter-
national relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4.
63. Pursuant to 1949 Geneva Convention IV (the first international agreement in the laws
of war to address exclusively the treatment of civilians), civilians are "p]ersons taking no
active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their
arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause .....
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 54, art. 3(l).
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lations were not designed as a suicide pact, and the peremptory expecta-
tion of Nullum crimen sine poena ("no crime without a punishment")
should not be dismissed lightly. Ideally, as we have already seen, the
members of the victorious allied coalition against Iraq could convene an-
other Nuremberg-style tribunal. 64 Alternatively, Israel could seek prose-
cution of Iraqi crimes committed during the Gulf War in its domestic
courts. Basing jurisdiction over the defendants on several well-estab-
lished principles of international law,65 such prosecution would represent
essential law-enforcement in a decentralized legal setting. It would also
follow the example set after World War II, where all countries that had
been occupied by German forces used their own courts for post-war tri-
als. However, should Israel select this option, custody over Saddam
Hussein et al. is unlikely to be accomplished by the preferred mecha-
nisms of extradition.6 6 As a result, Jerusalem would be forced to choose
64. Such a tribunal could be established under articles 22 and 29 of the United Nations
Charter, authorizing creation of subsidiary organs. In this connection, a very useful draft
indictment of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, his political, military and economic advisors,
and of other unnamed defendants, has been prepared by two distinguished legal scholars: Luis
Kutner, Chairman, Commission for International Due Process of Law and Professor Ved P.
Nanda, Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. Signifi-
cantly, within the draft indictment the only reference to crimes against Israel is contained in
Count II, War Crimes. Presumably the authors of the draft indictment feel that Iraq did not
commit aggression against Israel with the SCUD attacks because a state of war has existed
between the two countries since 1948.
65. The five traditional bases of jurisdiction under international law were defined, in 1935,
by Harvard Research in International Law: Territory; Nationality; Protective; Passive Person-
ality; and Universality. Harv. Research in Int'l L., Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Re-
spect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 445 (Supp. 1935). This Research represented part of
an effort by the American Society of International Law to codify international law. Of these
bases of jurisdiction, Israel could correctly claim jurisdiction over Iraqi defendants by rfer-
ence to Territory; Protective; Passive Personality; and Universality.
66. In principle, every state has an obligation not to grant asylum to alleged perpetrators
of genocide and genocide-like crimes. It follows that states that might grant Saddam Hussein
asylum would be in grievous violation of binding international rules. Note that the provisions
of the four Geneva Conventions stem from the maxim aut dedere aut punire, i.e., either a State
must extradite or make sure that a criminal is punished in its own municipal court proceed-
ings. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note
51, art. 7; Convention on the Nonapplicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, art. 3, 754 U.N.T.S. 73; Principles ofInternatlonal
Cooperation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, arts. 4, 7, G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess.,
Supp. No. 30, at 79, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); Declaration on Territorial Asylum, art. 1(2),
G.A. Res. 2312, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 81, U.N, Doc. A/6716 (1967);
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crimes of Apartheid, art.
4(b), G.A. Res. 3068, 28 U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030
(1973). First Geneva Convention, supra note 54, art. 49; Second Geneva Convention, supra
note 54, art. 50; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 54, art. 129; Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion, supra note 54, art. 146.
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between in absentia trials67 and trials in which the defendants are
brought to prosecution subsequent to abduction.6 s
Israel would be on firm jurisprudential ground if it chose to initiate
its own legal proceedings. The victim of multiple acts of aggression,
Israel could establish jurisdiction over Saddam Hussein et al. within its
own courts on the basis of its individual victimization or through the
67. In view of the obvious difficulties surrounding actual custody of Saddam Hussein and
other likely Iraqi defendants, Israel's trials may have to be conducted in absentia. There is
some precedent for such action with Nuremberg. For example, Martin Bormann was tried in
absentia on the presumption that he was still alive. According to the Charter of the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal, "[t]he Tribunal shall have the right to take proceedings against a
person charged with crimes set out in Article 6 of this Charter (crimes against peace, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity) in his absence, if he has not been found or if the Tribu-
nal, for any reason, finds it necessary, in the interests of justice, to conduct the hearing in his
absence." See supra note 4, art. 12.
However, normally trials in absentia may run counter to long-settled principles of justice
and due process in national and international law. In the Report of the 1953 Committee on
International Criminal Jurisdiction, the Committee reaffirmed the general principle of law that
an accused "should have the right to be present at all stages of the proceedings." Art. 29, U.N.
GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1954). In the Annex to the Report,
in the Committee's Revised Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, the rights of the
accused to a "fair trial" include, inter alia, "[t]he right to be present at all stages of the pro-
ceedings." Id art. 38(2)(a). The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms also stipulates that everyone charged with a criminal offense has
the right, inter alia, "to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choos-
ing." Supra note 52, art. 6(3)(c). See also International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supra note 52, art. 14(3)(d).
Strictly speaking, anyone charged with a criminal offense who is offered representation
"through legal assistance of his own choosing," as an alternative to defending himself in per-
son is being allowed essential minimum guarantees under the law and is not being deprived of
due process by trials in absentia. Similarly, anyone charged with a criminal offense who is
offered the opportunity "to defend himself in person," but declines to do so, is normally not
being mistreated under law. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eight Amendments to the United
States Constitution comprise a "bill of rights." Under these amendments and the Fourteenth
Amendment, every criminal defendant is guaranteed "due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amends. V, XIV. "Due process of law" derives from chapter 29 of Magna Carta (1225) where
the King promises that "no free man (nullus liber homo) shall be taken or imprisoned or
deprived of his freehold or his liberties of free customs, or outlawed or exiled, or in any manner
destroyed, nor shall we come upon him or send against him, except by a legal judgment of his
peers or by the law of the land (per legem terrae)." See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTrru-
tON AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 217 (1963) (citing 2 EDWARD COKE, INSrrruTEs 50-51
(1669)).
68. Recognizing that genociders are common enemies of mankind and that no authorita-
tive central institutions exist to apprehend such outlaws or to judge them, Israel sought to
uphold the antigenocide norms of international law in its trial of Adolf Eichmann. Adolf
Eichmainn was a Nazi functionary of German or Austrian nationality. Indicted under Israel's
Nazi Collaborators Punishment Law, Eichmann was convicted and executed after the judg-
ment was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Israel on appeal in 1962. See Attorney-General
v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 Int'l L. Rep. 5 (Isr. Dist. Ct. Jerusalem 1961), affd, 36 Int'l L Rep.
277 (Isr. S.Ct. 1962).
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doctrine of universal jurisdiction. Note that because a state of war con-
tinues to exist between Israel and every Arab state except Egypt,6 9 Israel
would be reasonable in not expecting cooperation from other states in the
Middle East in prosecuting Iraqi crimes."°
69. In this connection, the agreements that put an end to the first Arab-Israeli War (1947-
1949) were general armistice agreements negotiated bilaterally between Israel and Egypt, Ar-
mistice Agreement, Feb. 24, 1949, Isr.-Egypt, 42 U.N.T.S. 251-70; Israel and Lebanon, Armi-
stice Agreement, Mar. 23, 1949, Isr.-Leb., 42 U.N.T.S. 287-98; Israel and Jordan, Armistice
Agreement, Apr. 3, 1949, Isr.-Jordan, 42 U.N.T.S. 303-20; and Israel and Syria, Armistice
Agreement, July 20, 1949, Isr.-Syria, 42 U.N.T.S. 327-40. Pursuant to these agreements, the
Security Council, on August 11, 1949, issued a Resolution which, inter alia, "noted with satis-
faction the several Armistice Agreements," and "fflinds that the Armistice Agreements consti-
tute an important step toward the establishment of permanent peace in Palestine and considers
that these agreements supersede the truce provided for in Security Council resolutions 50
(1948) of 29 May and 54 (1948) of 15 July 1948." Resolution Noting the Armistice Agreements
and Reaffirming the Order to Observe an Unconditional Cease Fire Pending a Final Peace Set-
tlement, S.C. Res. 73, U.N. SCOR, 2d Sess., at 8, U.N. Doc. S/1376 (1949),
With the exception of Egypt, none of the aforelisted armistice agreements has been super-
seded by an authentic peace treaty. A general armistice is a war convention, an agreement or
contract concluded between belligerents. Such an agreement does not result in the termination
of a state of war. The 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, stipulates, at the Annex to the Convention, that "(a]n armistice suspends military
operations by mutual agreement between the belligerent parties." See Convention IV Respect-
ing the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex of Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 36, 36
Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 (entered into force for the United States on Jan. 26, 1910) (emphasis
added). The courts of individual states have also affirmed the principle that an armistice does
not end a war. See, eg., Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1, 9 (1921)
Indeed, throughout history, armistices have normally envisaged a resumption of hostili-
ties. It follows from this that since no treaties of peace obtain between Israel and the Arab
states with which it negotiated armistice agreements in 1949 (again, with the exception of
Egypt), a condition of belligerency continues to exist between these states and Israel. For
pertinent documents and commentary on Israel-Arab agreements, see pt. I of ROSALYN Hia-
GINS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 1946-1967 (1969), a study issued under the auspices
of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. For pertinent commentary and documents on
the historic status of relations between the Arab states and Israel, see ch. 12 of TREVOR N.
Dupuy, ELUSIVE VICTORY: THE ARAB-ISRAELI WARS, 1947-1974 (1978); pt. II of III THE
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLIcT (John N. Moore ed., 1974).
70. Although, it is generally believed that the peace treaty in force with Egypt constrains
that state from joining with other Arab forces against Israel, this belief is problematic. A
Minute to Article VI, paragraph 5 of the Israel-Egyptian Peace Treaty provides that it is
agreed by the parties that there is no assertion that the Peace Treaty prevails over other trea-
ties or agreements or that other treaties or agreements prevail over the Peace Treaty. Treaty of
Peace, Mar. 26, 1979, Egypt-Isr., minute to art. VI(5), 18 I.L.M. 362, 392. This means that
the treaty with Israel does not prevail over the defense treaties that Egypt has concluded with
Syria. Should Egypt determine that Israel has undertaken aggression against Syria it could
enter into belligerency against Israel on behalf of Damascus.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that even if Syria were to conmence hostilities against
Israel to recover the Golan Heights, Egypt might abrogate its agreement with Israel and offer
military assistance to Syria. Shortly after the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty was signed, then
Egyptian Prime Minister Khalil stated that he would regard any attempt by Syria to recover
the Golan-Heights as a defensive war, one that would bring into play the Egyptian-Syrian
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Whether Israel chooses to base its jurisdiction over Iraqi crimes on
territoriality and/or universality principles,71 it would have to make an-
other more serious decision. Namely, should prosecution take the form
of in absentia trials or should Saddam and possibly others be brought to
Israeli courts by abduction? At first glance, it would appear that the
second course is far more problematic jurisprudentially, and also poten-
tially more consequential as a pragmatic path toward real justice.
Guided by the expectations of Nullum crimen sine poena, Israel would
appear to be moving more expeditiously toward actual punishment by
opting for abduction over trials in absentia.
Upon closer examination, Israel would discover that abduction of a
"common enemy of mankind," such as Saddam Hussein et al., is not
nearly as problematic in law as one might think. Nonetheless, such an
abduction could involve considerable tactical (military) difficulties that
might be exceedingly costly. Further, should these difficulties prove
overwhelming or even nearly overwhelming, they could create substan-
tial harm to civilians in Iraq. 2 This ironic pattern of death, injury, and
destruction could ultimately undermine the operation's rationale as a
law-enforcing measure.
Yet, if the tactical problems could be handled without creating col-
lateral harms in Iraq, the abduction of Saddam Hussein et a. for trial in
Israel could be defended persuasively under international law. Recogniz-
ing that the only practical alternative to such a strategy would likely be
defense treaty despite the existence of the Israel-Egyptian Peace Treaty. Id; Joint Defense
Agreement, Oct. 20, 1955, Syria-Egypt, 227 U.N.T.S. 126.
71. A recent example supporting the principle of universal jurisdiction in matters con-
cerning genocide involves action by the United States. Ruling for the extradition to Israel of
accused Nazi war criminal John Demjanjuk, a U.S. Court of Appeals in 1985 recognized the
applicability of universal jurisdiction for genocide, even though the crimes charged were com-
mitted against persons who were not citizens of Israel and the State of Israel did not exist at
the time the heinous crimes were committed. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571. In the
words of the court, "[w]hen proceeding on that jurisdictional premise [universal jurisdiction]
neither the nationality of the accused or the victim(s), nor the location of the crime is signifi-
cant. The underlying assumption is that the crimes are offenses against the law of the nations
or against humanity, and that the prosecuting nation is acting for all nations." Id. at 582-83.
72. Historically, Iraq has sought to destroy Israel by force. In 1948, an Iraqi force or
20,000 invaded the infant State of Israel and occupied the area around Nablus, Jenin, and
Tulkarm. Later, Baghdad sent substantial numbers of expeditionary forces to fight against the
Jewish State during the Six Day War (1967) and the Yom Kippur War (1973). After the Six
Day War, Iraqi forces, which had been deployed in Jordan, remained there for more than two
years. In the Yom Kippur War, Iraq committed fully one-third of its then 95,000-man armed
forces to assist Syria in its campaign against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) on the Golan
Heights. See Yonathan L., Iraq: Regional Ambitions and Traditional Fears, IDF J., Summer
1990, at 56-62 (discussing the comprehensive and authoritative pre-Gulf War assessment of
Iraq's threat to Israel.)
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that monumental crimes be left unpunished, Israel's leaders would be
correct to argue that going outside the usual mechanisms of extradition
to secure custody would be more lawful than leaving this "hostes humani
generis"'73 free to commit further crimes of war, crimes against peace,
and crimes against humanity. This argument depends upon the pre-
sumption that ordinary mechanisms of extradition are inoperative, but
such a presumption is probably valid.
Generally, under international law, the abduction of a high official
representing a state is viewed as impermissible. It is typically considered
even more wrongful than abduction of private persons.74 However, there
are circumstances where the "jus cogens" expectations of world law
override the ordinary and codified prohibitions against abduction." The
most apparent are circumstances involving Nuremberg-category crimes,
precisely the sort of crimes committed by Saddam Hussein et at.
IV. CONCLUSION
Euripides, it appears, insisted upon mocking all truth. No god will
emerge from a machine to save us. 76 Now fully immersed in a world
where the unutterable has become real, we understand that our survival
as a species will depend entirely on ourselves, on our conscious decisions,
our courage, and on our commitments to the rule of law. At this critical
moment in our brief history as custodians of an endangered planet, a
multi-state habitat that accommodates an indecent alloy of banality and
73. See Harv. Research in Int'l L., supra note 65, at 566 (quoting Coke, C.J. in King v,
Marsh, 3 Bulstr. 27, 81 E.R. 23 (1615) ("a pirate est hostis humani generis")).
74. Normally there is a presumption of sovereign immunity. Such immunity is a binding
rule that exempts each state and its high officials from the judicial jurisdiction of another state.
In Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, Chief Justice Marshall argued for "the exemption of the
person of the sovereign from arrest or detention within a foreign territory." 11 U.S. at 137,
Historically, the rule of sovereign immunity may be traced to Roman Law and to the maxim of
English Law that the King can do no wrong. Under current United States law, the authorita-
tive expression of this rule may be found in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976).
75. In the United States, the terms of the Posse Comitatus Act prohibit the use of U.S.
military from undertaking domestic law enforcement. 18 U.S.C. 1385, According to several
authoritative memoranda, this prohibition does not apply outside the United States. See
Quigley, supra note 60, at 59-80. It would appear, therefore, that the United States has author-
ity under its own and international law to gain custody of Saddam Hussein et aL, by forcible
abduction if necessary.
76. Euripides, born in Salamis around 485 B.C., is generally regarded as the father of
modern European drama. His characteristic mode of concluding a play involved the appear-
ance of a god "out of the machine" (a kind of crane which hoisted the actor representing the
god above the other actors). Such an appearance solved endless complications and supplied a
happy ending.
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apocalypse, we will either learn to look unflinchingly to ourselves or pre-
pare for unbridled catastrophe and despair.
The Gulf War reminded the world that this is an "Age of Atroc-
ity."'7 7 The "Nuremberg-type" crimes committed by the leaders in Iraq
will long be remembered together with other horrors of the 20th century.
It is imperative not to let the crimes of the Gulf War go unpunished. As
I have argued, both the United States and Israel now possess a legal and
moral basis to prosecute the responsible Iraqi parties. Any further delay
in such prosecutorial efforts would undermine justice and international
law.
77. I am indebted for this term to a book by LAWRENCE L LANGER, THE AGE OF
ATRocITy: DEATH IN MODERN LrrERATURE (Boston Beacon Press 1978).
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